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China is a key player in global production, consumption, and trade of seafood. Given this dominance, Chinese
choices regarding what seafood to eat, and how and where to source it, are increasingly important—for
China, and for the rest of the world. This perspective explores this issue using a transdisciplinary approach
and discusses plausible trajectories and implications for assumptions of future modeling efforts and global
environmental sustainability and seafood supply. We outline China’s 2030 projected domestic seafood pro-
duction and consumption through an examination of available statistics, and qualitatively evaluate these in
relation to key stated Chinese policy targets, consumer trends, and dominant political narratives. Our anal-
ysis shows that by 2030 China is likely to see seafood consumption outstrip domestic production. To meet
the seafood gap China will likely attempt to increase domestic freshwater and offshore aquaculture, increase
seafood imports, possibly expand the distant water fishing industry, and invest in seafood production
abroad.Introduction
As pressures grow for terrestrial agriculture to reduce environ-
mental impacts, the world is looking toward aquatic environ-
ments to provide sustainable, nutrient-rich animal protein.1–3
However, recent scientific assessments conclude that, while
the potential for food production from oceans is greater than
what exists today—if we radically improve governance of wild
stocks and rely on technologies in aquaculture—there are also
significant environmental constraints, technological challenges,
and policy trade-offs to realize this growth.4–7 Therefore, how ac-
cess to and benefits of future finite volumes of seafood are likely
to be distributed warrants consideration.
China is a key player in global seafood trade, and represents
one of the largest producers, consumers, importers, and ex-
porters of seafood in the world.3,8 China’s consumption is
steadily growing and shifting toward an increasing amount of
high-value marine species.9 Given China’s dominance in the
sector, Chinese choices regarding what to eat, and how and
where to source this seafood, are increasingly important; not
just for China, but for the rest of the world.10
This perspective speaks to this issue by bringing together a
range of perspectives rarely treated together (fisheries and aqua-
culture production, policy analysis, ecology, and environmental
anthropology), to raise plausible trajectories and discuss their
implications for environmental sustainability and seafood acces-32 One Earth 3, July 24, 2020 ª 2020 The Author(s). Published by Els
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://sibility for China’s consumers, and the world. We do so by out-
lining China’s projected seafood consumption and domestic
production by 2030 through an examination of available statis-
tics. We qualitatively evaluate these in relation to key stated Chi-
nese policy targets and review and analyze both consumer
trends and dominant political narratives. Our analysis shows
that by 2030, a misalignment of 6–18 Mt is likely to emerge in
China as domestic seafood consumption outstrips production.
This corresponds to a gap of 9%–27% from the 2020 targets
for production. China will likely attempt to meet the seafood
gap with increased domestic freshwater and offshore aquacul-
ture, but this gap is unlikely to be met by domestic production
alone. China will likely increase seafood imports, possibly
expand the distant water fishing (DWF) industry, and invest in
seafood production abroad. We thus end with a reflection on
the implications of China’s growing seafood demand for the
world. Our hope is that the trajectories emerging from our anal-
ysis can stimulate a transdisciplinary debate about the assump-
tions of future modeling efforts and projections of seafood
production and consumption in China and beyond.
A Systems Perspective on Seafood in China
Taking a systems perspective can mean multiple things, but at a
minimum it requires illuminating a topic from multiple angles.
Understanding the future of seafood in China is akin toevier Inc.
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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rium models conventionally used to deliver projections of supply
and demand invariably struggle to account for all relevant vari-
ables,11,12 and to deliver reliable estimates under such condi-
tions of high uncertainty and lack of data.13 The added value of
our approach lies in bringing a transdisciplinary systems
perspective to the discussion of a topic that has been widely
recognized, but has mainly been explored through equilibrium
models or from a disciplinary focus.14 Below, we review China’s
dominant political narratives surrounding seafood, and illustrate
how these narratives have shaped domestic policy, and thus
Chinese seafood production. We also outline the recent con-
sumer trends that should inform assumptions made about the
development of Chinese seafood demand. Both angles are
fundamental to speculations about the future development of
China’s seafood consumption and strategies to satisfy it. While
China plays an important role in global seaweed production
and consumption, seafood in this paper refers only to aquatic
animals.
Policy Reform and Economic Considerations
Production and sourcing decisions in the Chinese fisheries and
aquaculture sector are naturally influenced by specific policies
for the sector, but also by larger national policy goals. Until
recently, Chinese national policy was focused on pursuing eco-
nomic growth, food security, and social stability. Although
broadly successful, this approach has come at the expense of
severe domestic environmental degradation.15,16 The response
by the central government has therefore been to shift toward
slower-paced, but higher-quality economic growth, taking into
account environmental sustainability. In 2007, the Communist
Party of China (CPC) announced a policy of ‘‘building an ecolog-
ical civilization’’—a post-industrial civilization more in balance
with the environment.17 The ‘‘eco-civilization’’ policy was later
enshrined as one of the five pillars of ‘‘socialism with Chinese
characteristics’’ in the 2018 constitution.18 Policy in the seafood
sector has mirrored this national-level development, as evident
through the ‘‘Marine Ecological Civilization Building Policy,’’
announced in 2015. While the Chinese political discourse has
experienced a significant ‘‘greening’’ recently, economic devel-
opment and national rejuvenation remain important sources of
legitimacy for the CPC and were the two key goals president Xi
Jinping laid out in his 2017 address to the CPC National
Congress.19 Therefore, it is important to consider these priorities
in any evaluation of future seafood production and consumption
scenarios.
Especially relevant for an understanding of China’s role in the
future global seafood system is how the growth of China’s ocean
economy is promoted as a way to offset slowed economic
growth on land and as a source of new resources. The central au-
thority has long viewed economic development as a means to
ensure social stability and to help achieve the goal of a ‘‘moder-
ately prosperous society’’ by 2020. This policy dates back to the
‘‘reform and opening up’’ period instituted by Deng Xiaoping in
1978, with high growth rates in production (including food) as
central features.20 However, blue growth would also further Chi-
na’s ambition to regain its position as an international leader. The
‘‘Belt and Road’’ Initiative is pursued, in part, with the ambition to
build China into a ‘‘maritime power.’’ Investments are currentlybeing made to advance scientific and technological capabilities
to contribute to the ‘‘blue economy’’21—another pathway to
enhance China’s global prestige, and thus national rejuvenation.
This brief review of concurrent political narratives shaping Chi-
nese policy development highlights an inherent tension between
economic and sustainability goals. In the coastal domain, this
tension is exemplified by the trade-off between expanding sec-
tors of the ocean economy, such as seabed mining, and their
negative effect on production capacity of China’s fishing and
aquaculture sector through degradation of fishing grounds, envi-
ronmental quality, or competition for space.22
Changing Modes of Production over Time
During the reform and opening up period, China’s seafood pro-
duction increased significantly, underpinned largely by the
expansion of aquaculture starting in the mid-1980s.20 Seafood
production has since grown exponentially, but the production
portfolio has changed.23 In 1978, domestic capture fisheries
played a central role and represented 57% of total production,
while in 2014 this source had shrunk to a mere 15% (Figure 1).
In contrast, aquaculture has grown to represent 72% of produc-
tion in 2014 (from a mere 26% in 1978), with an approximate
40-fold increase in both freshwater aquaculture and mariculture.
Shifts in production modes over time were driven in part by
depletion of individual stocks and exploitation of new ones26,27
(see also Figure S1 and Table S1 for historical comparison of
top species landed), and later by attempts to reduce domestic
overfishing while maintaining rural livelihoods, by shifting people
into aquaculture and DWF.28
Today China is the leading aquaculture producer in the
world, accounting for 58% of global production in 2018.3
Approximately 90% of freshwater volumes are finfish, domi-
nated by carp (Cyprinidae) and tilapia, representing about
64% and 11% of global freshwater finfish, respectively.24
Carp is produced mainly for domestic consumption, whereas
tilapia is primarily exported as a low-cost alternative to other
whitefish in many countries.29 Even if recent large-scale
offshore finfish initiative exists, to date, farming of marine fish
occurs mainly in nearshore waters and around 75% of maricul-
ture volumes produced (including salmon and shrimps) consist
of molluscs.24
Growth of DWF began in the 1980s and stemmed from a
combination of policy goals related to domestic fisheries con-
servation, rural employment, food security, and foreign pol-
icies to increase China’s global maritime presence.28 DWF
was both a means to secure access in the global race for ma-
rine resources28,30 but also an avenue through which China
pursued aid and diplomacy with coastal states,28 as reflected
by the support for the DWF sector in the 2001–2005 10th Five-
year Plan (FYP).28,31 Today China fishes the largest area of the
global high seas and lands the highest estimated catch.32 The
portion of this seafood supplying domestic Chinese markets
ranges from 49% in 2009, to 66% in 2014, and slightly lower
in recent years.33 While constituting many vessels, China’s
average DWF fleet production capacity remains lower than
many other DWF nations.28 The fleet is heavily dependent on
subsidies, which were estimated to represent about 20% of
the overall value of the reported catch in China in 2010.32
China provides an estimated US $7.2 billion to its fishingOne Earth 3, July 24, 2020 33
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Figure 1. Chinese Seafood Production over
Time
Circular charts highlight the shifting sources of
production over time. Shades of purple represent
domestic aquaculture, shades of blue are domestic
capture fisheries, and shades of green are capture
fisheries in international waters. Figures inside each
segment of the circles indicate production (in Mt) of
a particular subsector for each time period (1978
versus 2014). See Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for justification for the chosen dates for
comparison. The area attributed to the domestic
EEZ is based on the claimed EEZ and thus includes
disputed territories (see Figure S2 for exact delin-
eation used). Data sources: FAO24,25 (mainland
China reported data used only).
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OPEN ACCESS Perspectiveindustry, 21% of the global total,34 and while efforts are under-
way to reduce subsidies for the domestic fleet, these cuts do
not seem to hold for the DWF fleet. Some subsidies are known
to promote overcapacity,35 and while uncertainties still sur-
round Chinese DWF catch, evidence suggests they may be
under-reported.36 Recently, China issued policies in line
with a more sustainable approach toward the DWF industry,
yet having the capability to access global resources to
meet domestic seafood needs remains a national strategic pri-
ority, signaling uncertainty in the path China chooses going
forward.
Shifting Chinese Preferences and Consumption
Since 1978, China has moved from a diet rich in coarse grain, le-
gumes, and vegetables; to one rich in fat, sugar, and animal pro-
tein.37 Dietary changes were mirrored by equally significant
changes in the food system—from supply chains structure,
food procurement, and transportation within China, to changes
in packing, processing, restaurant, and retail sectors38,39—mak-
ing it difficult to deduce direct causal relationships between indi-
vidual drivers and dietary change. However, evidence suggest
several interlinked factors have contributed to the rapid increase
in Chinese consumption of seafood and other animal products,
including improved food availability through imports, urbaniza-
tion, increased incomes, and changes in lifestyles and taste pref-
erences.37,39 These factors have also influenced how and what
seafood is demanded. Significant food safety problems and ris-
ing middle-class expectations have shifted consumer focus to-
ward quality and safety, reflected in the labels and retail market-
ing of seafood as ‘‘natural,’’ ‘‘safe,’’ ‘‘healthy,’’ and ‘‘pollution-
free.’’40 Consumer notions of high-quality and safe seafood
generally include wild (as opposed to farmed), marine (as
opposed to freshwater), and imported (as opposed to domesti-
cally produced) seafood, particularly from countries considered
to have ‘‘clean’’ waters, such as Australia, Norway, and North
America.9,4134 One Earth 3, July 24, 2020An important example of changing pref-
erences is the rapid acceptance of various
processed salmon products, being
notably different from traditional live fresh-
water fish, both in palatability and price.9
Chinese consumers have traditionally
preferred fresh seafood, but frozen prod-ucts are becoming increasingly acceptable as a more conve-
nient alternative, particularly in urban areas.9 Increased capacity
for refrigerated transport and household ownership of refrigera-
tors has enabled this growth in frozen seafood consumption.33
Industry sources suggest an increasing proportion of frozen sea-
food is now sold on the domestic market,42 some of which is
domestically produced. However, national import statistics pre-
clude differentiation between volumes of frozen seafood
destined for processing and re-export versus domestic con-
sumption. This lack of data granularity makes precise estimates
of the origin of the increasing frozen seafood volumes consumed
in China difficult, but because frozen seafood is currently mostly
associated with marine rather than freshwater species (such as
carp),9 increased consumption of frozen seafood can nonethe-
less expected to result in greater consumption of marine
species.
The various ways of estimating seafood consumption in China
result in significantly different projections (Figure 2A). Govern-
ment surveys of household consumption have measured a rise
in national per capita consumption of seafood from 3.1 kg in
1985 to 11.4 kg in 2016, and this can be disaggregated by urban
and rural populations.43 As government data do not capture out-
of-home consumption, they likely underestimate consumption
by 20%–35% for both rural and urban areas.29 Other figures
often cited as consumption proxies are the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) food balance sheets, representing whole fish
and originating from balanced government trade statistics.44
FAO data show availability of food per capita, not actual levels
of consumption, and tend to significantly overestimate con-
sumption.45 While providing a coarser-grained picture than
household survey data, FAO data are comparable across coun-
tries over time, hence their dominant use in most economic
models and other analyses.14,46,47 To illustrate the elusive nature
of the state-of-the-art knowledge around Chinese seafood con-
sumption, Figure 2A shows both these estimates; not for com-























































































































Figure 2. Chinese Seafood Consumption
Trends and Drivers
(A) Seafood consumption within China; the upper
limit represents the FAO food supply per capita
(food balance sheets) and the lower estimated
consumption is the weighted (for urban/rural) na-
tional average consumption based on government
data through the Chinese national Household Sur-
veys (CHS). The CHS data summaries from which
data stem do not specify if reported figures are live
or edible weight. We report them as live weight, see
justification in Supplemental Experimental Proced-
ures. Dashed lines are the household surveys split
by rural and urban residents.
(B) Urbanization over time.
(C) Yearly disposable incomes across urban and
rural households.
Data sources: National Bureau of
Statistics33,43 and FAO44
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OPEN ACCESSPerspectiveseafood consumption, and to highlight the wide range of
possible consumption figures. We also show two key drivers
believed to influence these trends: urbanization and income
growth (Figures 2B and 2C), both of which are important
to consider when discussing plausible future consumption
trajectories.
Current Chinese Seafood Production and Consumption
China’s regular iterations of FYPs constitute one of the most
important platforms for outlining the direction of national develop-
ment for the coming 5-year periods, both nationally and in specific
sectors.48 The 13th Five-year Plan for Fisheries (from hereon
13FYP), covering 2016–2020, lays out the most recent priorities
relating to seafood and is therefore at the center of our analysis
asweexamineChina’sdevelopmentofdomestic seafoodproduc-
tion and consumption. To avoid confusion with how the term de-
mand is used in economic analyses,weuse the termconsumption
throughout our analysis, while recognizing that Chinese citizens
are not mere consumers without any agency to actively choose
what they eat. Chinese purchasing decisions are a manifestation
of this reality, and current trends will, at least to some degree,
shape thenatureof futureseafooddemand.Assuch, consumption
here refers to deliberate consumption. We use production todenote domestically produced seafood
(including via DWF), and total supply when
referring to the total seafood resources likely
to be required for China to meet projected
consumption. Accounting for both capture
fisheries and aquaculture, we synthesize
national and international statistics to esti-
mate a plausible range of Chinese domestic
production and consumption in 2030 (Table
1), and discuss the findings in relation to the
targets set out in the 13FYP.
Figure 3 shows volumes of Chinese sea-
food imports, exports, and domestic pro-
duction based on the latest comparable
datasets (limited to 2014 by Sea Around
Us data availability, see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for justifications
of this). The purpose of Figure 3 is to syn-thesize and compare available statistics on production and con-
sumption to make explicit possible misalignments between
these projections, and to allow us to discuss these in relation
to the officially stated ambitions in the form of 13FYP targets,
as well as the dominant political narratives and consumer prefer-
ences reviewed above.
Notably, the majority of imported seafood is not currently
consumed, but is re-exported from China (Figure 3; Trade flows
A and B), sometimes preceded by processing (Trade flow A) (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for full methods). Do-
mestic production is shown first by origin and mode of produc-
tion (left). Next, domestic production is broken down to illustrate
key salient groupings of seafood across marine and freshwater
systems, based on the consumer preferences noted above.
We then use FAO conversion factors to estimate how much of
the 63 Mt of whole seafood produced that is likely to be edible
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Of these approx-
imately 28Mt we subtract 2 Mt that statistics show are exported,
leaving 26 Mt of edible seafood available for domestic produc-
tion. To compare production to consumption we use Chinese
household consumption data for urban and rural populations,
increased by 35% according to Chiu et al.29 This adjustment is
warranted as national statistics do not account for out-of-One Earth 3, July 24, 2020 35
Table 1. Seafood Production and Consumption of China in the
Past and Projected for the Future
2014 2020 2030
Million tons (Mt) live weight live weight live weight
Production 63a 66b misalignment?
Low consumptionc 45d 56 72
High consumptione – 58 84
As such, environmental or other constraints to production are not ac-
counted for in these figures. Conversions between edible and live weight
are made based on the conversion factors and ‘‘species’’ breakdown of
the 2014 production data (Figure 3). See Table S4 for comparison with
edible weight, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures for more de-
tails and calculations.
aProduction in 2014 calculated based on FAO and Sea Around Us (SAU)
data (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
bProjected production in 2020 based on the targets set in the 13th FYP.
cLinear model estimate of consumption: based on overall average calcu-
lated from consumption data from 1978 to 2016 and linearly extrapolated
to 2030; where urban and rural data are weighted according to UN urban-
ization population projections, and overall consumption augmented
by 35%.29
d2014: total consumption = ((rural consumption 3 1.35) 3 rural popula-
tion) + ((urban consumption 3 1.35) 3 urban population).
eExponential model estimate of consumption: based on overall average
calculated from consumption data from 1978 to 2016 and then applied
as a yearly increase until 2030; where urban and rural are weighted ac-
cording to UN urbanization population projections, and overall consump-
tion augmented by 35%.29
ll
OPEN ACCESS Perspectivehome consumption. The percentage is comparable with other
estimates of Asian out-of-home consumption for seafood,52,53
but somewhat lower than noted for purely urban Chinese envi-
ronments,9 suggesting that our consumption estimates are
salient but could slightly underestimate future demand. Through
this calculation we arrive at a total consumption of approximately
20 Mt (in 2014), well within range of the estimated 26 Mt of avail-
able seafood, which concurs with observations that, as of 2014,
China’s domestic production was enough to cover domestic de-
mand. However, what does a projection of current domestic pro-
duction and consumption statistics tell us about the future?Chinese Seafood Production and Consumption up
to 2030
Forecasting is notoriously difficult, and we note that 2030 is an
arbitrary reference year. However, a much-cited World Bank
analysis used 2030 as a reference to model global fish supply,
demand, and trade,14 and 2030 also aligns with China’s FYP pe-
riods. Furthermore, simple projections of current trends can be
misleading, but attempting to model complex systems with
limited or uncertain data can be equally deceiving. For example,
the equilibrium model used in ‘‘Fish to 2030’’ did not account for
labor and improved cost-effectiveness,11 nor did it account for
biophysical limitations, such as availability of wild fish for fish-
meal production, land, or freshwater.12 We therefore opt for a
simple but transparent arithmetic to highlight plausible misalign-
ment between Chinese seafood production and consumption
based on current observed trends (Table 1), and interpreting
these in light of observed consumer preferences, population36 One Earth 3, July 24, 2020development, urbanization, technological development, and
environmental constraints to domestic production; all key to
understanding China’s likely seafood sourcing needs and
strategies.
Table 1 summarizes comparisons between the observed 2014
production and consumption figures and the 13FYP production
targets for 2020. Table 1 also compares these figures with pro-
jections of domestic consumption for 2020 and 2030, arrived
at through extrapolation of data from 1978 to 2016, using both
a linear and an exponential model estimate, to create a range
of low and high projected consumption (more detail in Table
S4). For 2020 this range is between 56 and 58 Mt, and for 2030
it is between 72 and 84 Mt (in live weight). The low consumption
scenario most likely underestimates future consumption by ne-
glecting to account for the sharp upward turn in both rural and
urban seafood consumption in the recent past (Figure 2A).
Conversely, the high consumption scenario likely overestimates
consumption closer to 2030. However, even if actual seafood
consumption develops closer to the lower bound, this suggests
that in 2030 China would need a minimum of 6 Mt of additional
seafood to cover projected demand (compare 66 Mt production
in 2020with 72Mt lower consumption estimate for 2030, Table 1)
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). The less-conser-
vative assumptions about demand suggest a misalignment of
18Mt in 2030 (calculated as the difference between 2030 high
consumption and 2020 production estimates). Contemplating
this gap, it is also important to acknowledge the adjustments
that are regularly made to official production data. While not
included in this analysis, it is noteworthy that Chinese national
statistics on total seafood production were adjusted downward
by the government for both 2016 and 2015, by 4–5 Mt each
year. This uncertainty regarding actual production volumes indi-
cates that the misalignment could be even larger than indicated
here. So how likely is it that a majority of the projected seafood
demand can be supplied by domestic production alone?
Constraints to Domestic Production
Any attempt at forecasting China’s future seafood production
necessitates a discussion (albeit brief) about key production
constraints. These constraints emanate from environmental
change, technology, and feed development, and the interaction
of political narratives and policy development outlined above,
and have implications for domestic production potential.
Furthermore, the constraints relate not only to China’s own sea-
food production development, but also to availability of seafood
and feed resources globally.
Table 2 outlines key factors affecting production, highlighted
based on their recurrence and prominence in the academic liter-
ature. Empirical evidence for the development trajectories of
each is patchy, at best, but can provide an indication of key fac-
tors and plausible ‘‘game changers.’’ First, domestic supply will
depend largely on whether more stringent regulations will actu-
ally affect capture quotas and ultimately allow regeneration of
domestic wild stocks, and the implications of this for domestic
feed resources available for aquaculture growth. However, avail-
ability of fish-based feed resources could also be increasingly
derived from more efficient utilization of domestic processing
wastes, but may be counteracted by a limited supply of imported












































































Figure 3. A Disaggregated View of Production
Data are in Mt and represents 2014 as this is the latest year with complete data available to allow disaggregation (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
motivation of data choice). Note that all trade flows are given in net weight, whereas ‘‘Production’’ (capture and aquaculture) and ‘‘Whole seafood’’ are in live
weight. Edible seafood is an approximation from whole seafood volume to edible yield using conversion factors (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Trade flow A represents the ‘‘pure’’ processing trade, i.e., seafood that is imported, processed, and exported. Waste products from processing are increasingly
being turned into fishmeal for domestic aquaculture,49 but this cannot be quantified currently. Trade flow B is a less clear flow, where seafood is imported but
mixed with domestic production and re-exported. Trade flow C represents the flow of imported fishmeal to domestic aquaculture production. A detailed
breakdown of all seafood groups and trade flows can be found in Supplemental Information (Tables S2 and S3). Data sources: FAO,24 Pauly and Zeller,25 Cao et
al.,50 and Bai et al.51
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OPEN ACCESSPerspectivecompetition for fishmeal and oil from livestock production.54 In-
gredients for novel feeds are rapidly developing, especially for
marine and brackish water species. Production has already
increased for some new feeds, such as microalgae and insect
meal, but there remain large uncertainties about implementation
at the scale needed.55
Mussels and seaweeds already play a significant role in Chi-
na’s aquaculture portfolio. Their expansion is not limited by
feed development, but instead by competition for space with
other industries, and is highly affected by degraded water qual-
ity. Current trends already indicate increasingly degraded
coastal water quality,61,77 but the stated ambition to strengthen
pollution regulation could change this trajectory. Suitable space
and access to freshwater and healthy environments are thus two
key factors that could limit expansion of aquaculture on land and
along coasts.62,64 Offshore areas may offer alternative routes for
expansion of innovative culture systems but, even though large-
scale systems have recently been installed, there are large un-
certainties related to future development potential, including
durability of the technology, cost-effectiveness, access to feed
resources, and in some areas competition for space within the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).5,67
Climate change naturally poses a threat to seafood produc-
tion in both marine and freshwater ecosystems.78 The IPCC
has shown that China is already experiencing more frequentand intense drought and flooding events79 and the maximum
catch potential and fisheries revenues in the EEZ of China are
projected to decrease by 12% and 9%, respectively.80 China
is also projected to be one of the most vulnerable countries
to climate change impacts on its inland fisheries and both
freshwater and marine aquaculture.78 Therefore, when com-
bined with other anthropogenic drivers, climate change adds
uncertainty to China’s ability to maintain its food supply in the
future.79
Given the production constraints outlined above, it is unlikely
that a majority of the seafood needed to cover projected con-
sumption in 2030 can be supplied by domestic production alone.
Furthermore, the 13FYP notably states specific targets to
decrease overall seafood production by 1 Mt and decrease do-
mestic capture by a minimum of 3 Mt, suggesting that a mini-
mum of 2 Mt of additional seafood will have to be produced in
other seafood subsectors to simply compensate for the pro-
jected shortfall from domestic capture (see also Szuwalski
et al.81). DWF has been a strategy by which China has increased
domestic seafood supply in the past, but the 13FYP target for
DWF is only 0.1Mt higher than 2015 catch, while vessel numbers
are set to be reduced (Table S5). Without significant increase in
DWF activity in the next (14th) FYP it is therefore hard to see this
sector as a major contributor in the future. Instead, aquaculture
will have to increase—from 49.4 Mt in 2015 to 53.7 Mt byOne Earth 3, July 24, 2020 37
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The table shows key factors likely to affect (constrain) domestic Chinese seafood supply. It does not include factors, such as climate change, or insta-
bility in global economy, such as emerging trade wars, which are likely to affect most nations and where effects are less likely to be discernable in the
timeframe of this paper. Arrows indicate plausible increasing versus decreasing trends, as described in the reviewed literature. Solid arrows indicate
some certainty of trend direction (as backed by References), while dashed arrows are highly uncertain. Where not indicated otherwise, aquaculture
refers to both marine and freshwater production.
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OPEN ACCESS Perspective2020, and to approximately 60 Mt by 2030 (i.e., an increase of
10.5 Mt) (Table S5). This target is potentially achievable given
the approximately 11-Mt production increase reported in the
previous 5-year period.33 However, growth rates of overall fresh-
water and carp production have actually declined in the last
decade, from 36% to 21%, and from 32% to 21%, respec-
tively,44 and this production has been blamed for the increasingly
acute pollution of inland and coastal waters,16,55,82 indicating
limits for future expansion. The 13FYP notes an obligatory target
of a 120,000-hectare reduction of coastal mariculture area by
2020, and the documented severe coastal pollution (partly as a
result of existing mariculture)61,62 signals limited possibilities
for significant expansion in nearshore production (Table 1).
Offshore mariculture is therefore the most promising option,
but, as noted above, current feed costs and limited testing of
technologies in offshore locations makes predictions regarding
this production mode difficult at present. Finally, most farmed
marine finfish are carnivorous (or omnivorous) andwill not consti-
tute net fish protein addition if feeds continue to rely on fish re-
sources other than seafood processing wastes and other protein
sources not suitable for human foods.83
Given the likely misalignment between Chinese seafood de-
mand and domestic supply by 2030, what are plausible Chinese
strategies to address this? And what are the possible implica-
tions of these strategies on the rest of the world? In discussing
these issues we need to consider not only the quantity of the
fish protein, but also the quality and type, as the price of bulk
fish, such as carp and tilapia already indicates a saturated Chi-
nese market.84 This development suggests that at least some
Chinese consumers are looking for other seafood to put on their
plates.
A New ‘‘Business as Usual’’?
Exploring future development trajectories requires an anchoring
point in the present. This undertaking is commonly achieved by
grounding discussions in the current state of affairs. However, to
label the 13FYP business as usual would be misleading, as the
plan notes a clear ambition tomove beyond simple extrapolation
of past production trends and sets a lofty goal to achieve an
ecologically sustainable civilization.17 The fact that the ‘‘eco-civi-
lization’’ policy is now incorporated into the constitution,18
combined with the increasing evidence of codification of this
narrative,17 also strengthens it as a baseline to discuss plausible40 One Earth 3, July 24, 2020Chinese trajectories and strategies to address future alignment
between seafood production and consumption. Below we elab-
orate and contrast two trajectories that China may follow, outlin-
ing empirical evidence supporting these, and highlighting the key
challenges and likely implications associated with each.
Diverging Trajectories
The preceding analysis makes it clear that, while 2020 produc-
tion and consumption figures are relatively aligned, by 2030
China is likely to need an additional 6–18 Mt to satisfy projected
consumption. While the higher consumption figure (18 Mt) is un-
likely, our analysis nonetheless provides data-driven upper and
lower boundaries to frame a discussion on China’s future sea-
food needs. Such a discussion can be developed by elaborating
two contrasting scenarios. The first takes a productionist stance
(sensu).85,86 The productionist stance assumes China will aim to
meet its own future seafood needs through domestic aquacul-
ture. While China’s food security policies focus mainly on agri-
culture, and food security concerns have declined since the
1980s, improved food security is a stated goal of fisheries and
aquaculture policy,23 and aquaculture and DWF are generally
held up as important means to achieve this goal.28 However,
the 13FYP targets simultaneously aim to reduce domestic cap-
ture and coastal mariculture area, while allowing a limited in-
crease in DWF (Table S4). These policies leave freshwater and
offshore aquaculture as the only realistic sources of increased
domestic production (see, e.g., Cao et al.23). Molluscs and
carp are the primary species looked to for this future increase,
but higher trophic species are also possible, for example in
offshore waters, but may be limited by feed supply.5
Chinese freshwater aquaculture is unquestionably important,
and has shown impressive growth in production (for more
detailed review of China’s aquaculture sector,60,55,87,88). How-
ever, its possibility for future expansion may be strongly affected
by the central government policy on food security, which favors
major crop self-supply and farmland protection. Furthermore,
the Chinese policy shift in recent years to prioritize quality over
quantity in seafood production, along with Chinese statistics
showing the quick production decline in many freshwater envi-
ronments,44 all suggest that a trajectory of rapid growth of fresh-
water aquaculture may not be materializing.
Offshore aquaculture is a field that is currently attracting signif-
icant attention worldwide, but it is still in its infancy, with only few
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Oyinlola et al.67). Recent investments indicate this direction is a
road Chinese industry is keen to take,89 but the timescale at
which such offshore farms will be fully operational and viable re-
mains unclear. Offshore aquaculture also comes with its own set
of general uncertainties and challenges,4,5,67 where environ-
mental impacts and geopolitical conflicts linked to siting deci-
sions are arguably highly salient to China.
Finally, it is important to note that, while domestic produc-
tion of carp and molluscs may be a theoretically plausible
way of filling a growing seafood demand in China, a key chal-
lenge remains: namely how to shift observed consumer trends
away from marine, carnivorous, and imported species in a
context of a rapidly urbanizing and wealthier population. Cur-
rent trends indicate increasing Chinese demand for marine
and higher trophic level species that will require larger vol-
umes of fish-based feed, unless suitable alternatives are
developed. Better utilization of domestic or foreign processing
waste could initially fill such a feed gap (Table 1),49 but the de-
gree to which it can satisfy the total projected feed demand
remains uncertain. Aligning production and consumption in a
productionist-focused trajectory would thus entail either solv-
ing the feed equation or drastically curtailing Chinese con-
sumer choices.
In China, as in many nations, the conflict between economic
development and environmental protection is a prominent
source of policy incoherence for fisheries and aquaculture.17,90
However, against the backdrop of noted environmental produc-
tion constraints, consumer trends, and 13FYP targets, a second
trajectory characterized by increased imports appears as a
feasible alternative for China to supply the volumes necessary,
while minimizing negative domestic environmental footprints—
especially considering consumer perceptions relating to the
increased health benefits of imported seafood.9 Such a strategy
is one taken by many industrialized economies over the last
century.91
Along with rising purchasing power, there is growing evidence
that China is pursuing this path for a number of commodities,
with varied effects on global market prices.92 In fact, the 40-
year anniversary of China’s ‘‘opening up’’ policy was marked
by China’s first International Import Expo organized in Shanghai
in 2018. Agricultural (including fisheries) products are one of
eight major markets China intends to open to international trade.
Chinese trade values of imported agricultural products reported
by WTO have increased from 20 (2000) to 180 (2016) billion USD
over the last two decades, and seafood imports have risen
dramatically (ranging from 26% to 400% increase since 2014 de-
pending on product type).93 This trend is a strong indication of
China’s current trajectory toward a market-based, demand-
driven economy for these commodities. However, this path re-
quires accessing sufficient production internationally, and the
strategies China pursues to do so will have implications for the
rest of the world.
Chinese Choices—Implications for the Rest of theWorld
While China appears to be on a trajectory toward increased sea-
food sourcing outside its borders, to date no study exists that
comprehensively examines the implication of this on global sea-
food production, markets, and availability. Such an analysisis beyond this paper, but three areas of interest are worth
highlighting.
One way to source seafood is trade. At 4 Mt per year (approx-
imate as of 2016) China is already the world’s largest seafood
and fishmeal importer by volume. An increase of 6 Mt, or any-
thing beyond (Table 2, 2030 projections), is certain to have impli-
cations for seafood availability and markets in the rest of the
world (cf.8,14). But imports do not tell the whole story. In fact, Chi-
na’s current role in the global seafood system is primarily as a
value-adding hub, with a large portion of the seafood imported
simply passing through the country via various value-adding pro-
cesses. This explains the value-based trade surplus that has
earned China its status as a ‘‘seafood trade giant’’ (Figure S3),
and indicates that currently China’s fisheries imports are not
contributing significantly to domestic consumption (with the
exception of the fishmeal used for domestic aquaculture produc-
tion) (Figure 3). Could this change in the near future? Our analysis
concurs with others predicting a likely increase in imports of the
commodities that are currently primarily re-exported, such as
salmon and whitefish.14,94 But increasing Chinese demand will
compete with other large consumers, such as the EU and the
US.8 Current trade reports suggest this is already happening.95
It is also plausible that imports from Asian neighbors will in-
crease. Import price differences between the EU, the US, and
China are declining, and regulations relating to anti-dumping, la-
bor standards, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated landings
are less stringently applied in China than in other major importing
nations.96 Combined with past tit-for-tat tariff exchanges and
import bans between China and other nations (notably the US
and Norway) these developments may increase the likelihood
that trade flows are redirected to China should its demand rise.
Finally, the current pandemic is having an immense impact on
seafood supply chains everywhere, with dwindling demand,
and effects on production and supply chain logistics.97 Con-
sumer food safety concerns have also come to the fore in sea-
food trade again, particularly in China.98 The long-term effects
of this turmoil on seafood trade patterns is uncertain, but will
affect both imports and exports.
Another sourcing strategy is to catch it yourself. While current
targets suggest a decline in DWF, this mode of securing rawma-
terial may once again come to play a key role. While there is
some confusion over the exact number of China’s DWF ves-
sels,99 nonetheless, China is already estimated to account for
the biggest share of catch in the high seas, and like many nations
its fleet is heavily subsidized.32 Plans to modernize the fleet
could improve profitability, and reduce energy use and negative
climate impact, but the increased efficiency could also create or
enhance overcapacity and threaten already dwindling stocks in
other nations’ EEZs and areas beyond, which are not currently
safeguarded by adequate regulation and enforcement (cf.100).
An increased DWF presence would align with Chinese ambitions
of increasing sea power, but could damage the efforts being
made to appear as a responsible global actor worthy of interna-
tional leadership. Rising fuel prices as a result of climate change
policies could of course affect all DWF expansion possibilities.
As such, Chinese strategies in this domain remain to be seen.
A third path to sourcing food supplies is by investing in pro-
duction in other countries. The Belt and Road Initiative provides
the overarching framework for this possibility, and large foreignOne Earth 3, July 24, 2020 41
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tered access to fishing grounds is another pathway projected
to become more common in the future,102 and recent corporate
attempts at acquisitions signal Chinese efforts to take control of
key fish meal supplies abroad.103 Some of these large-scale
overseas investments in seafood production could arguably
offer employment and development opportunities in receiving
nations but the environmental and social impacts of Chinese
business practices are poorly documented and remain a topic
of intense debate.17,104 Many wild stocks in the high seas and
in EEZs of developing countries remain poorly understood and
managed, and the environmental impacts associated with inten-
sive aquaculture in China are likely to be replicated in settings
lacking strong governance to ensure social and environmental
sustainability.
The three pathways to Chinese impact on the global seafood
system discussed here can serve two purposes. First, they can
inspire future models of seafood supply and demand, and the
preceding review can provide a basis for contextually grounded
assumptions regarding demand, production constraints, and
trade. Second, these pathways deserve to be considered in
the context of global seafood production trends, where many
countries around the world are facing similar limits to domestic
production as China. Increasing imports is only feasible if pro-
duction surplus exists elsewhere and nations possess the pur-
chasing power to acquire it. As the world may be approaching
the constraints of a finite, global, seafood production capacity,6,7
all nations’ sourcing trajectories need to be considered together.
Our analysis has provided a transdisciplinary dive into China—
the largest actor on the global seafood arena today. This article
raises more questions than it can answer, and notes many
uncertainties; but by exploring political, environmental, and con-
sumer perspectives it hopes to provide a basis for a multi-
faceted discussion of China’s (and other nations’) future seafood
needs and possible implications for global seafood system sus-
tainability. As China scholars Geall and Ely17 note, because of its
global impact and its dynamism, China is critical for unlocking
the transformative innovation needed to reconfigure patterns of
global development, in fisheries and other sectors.
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